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McCleary: McCleary:Torts in Missouri

TORTS IN MISSOURI*
GLENN A. McCLEARY**
This portion of the survey of the work of the Missouri supreme
court, covering the. eighteen months from January 1, 1958, includes 84
decisions but excludes the humanitarian cases which will be discussed
by Mr. Becker in the next issue of the REVIEw. For purposes of statistical
interest, there were more than 100 decisions in the torts field in this
period. This number reflects the vast amount of litigation and large
proportion of the time and energies required of an appellate court in this
field.
To give prominence to the decisions of more than ordinary interest
the writer has selected from the list four cases which will be discusied
out of their usual classification. One of the developing areas in tort law
involves the liability of suppliers of food and beverages which come in
sealed packages or containers and which are non-inspectable by the
consumer. When the liability of the manufacturer first came before
courts, the tort of negligence had not been fully developed. Out of a
desire to protect infant industries, at a time when modern methods of
production were not developed, the courts found no basis for liability in
negligence to the consumer unless there was privity of contract. The
breakdown of the privity requirement, and the recognition that ordinary
principles of negligence are applicable where there is a foreseeable risk
of injury to the consumer, are interesting developments of the common
law. The same development is seen where the theory of liability of a
supplier of food and drink in sealed packages and containers is based
upon a theory of implied warranty of fitness for the purpose for which
the food or drink is sold. Although warranty arises as a contractual
undertaking, the privity of contract requirement in cases involving the
above products is no longer required by many courts, upon the theory that
the enterprise should bear the risks where the consumer suffers injuries
from impurities contained in these products which are to be taken
internally. Where privity of contract is not required, the theory of
*This Article contains a discussion of selected 1958 and 1959 Missouri court
decisions.
**Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
(476)
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liability becomes one of strict liability. Other courts requiring privity
of contract for liability based on implied warranty, find a fictitious
privity from advertisements of the product or on a theory of implied
warranty of fitness running with the product into the hands of the consumer. The Missouri courts of appeals have applied strict liability in
cases involving sealed food and beverage in several decisions, but the
Missouri supreme court had not as yet passed on the liability of the
manufacturer, until the cases of Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co.
and Ozark Trout Farm v. M.F.A. Milling Co.1
In both of these cases, the petitions were identical. In each case the
defendant's motion to dismiss the petition for failing to state a claim was
sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the cases were treated by the
parties as consolidated. The actions were against the manufacturer of fish
food for damage to trout which the plaintiffs raised for commercial
purposes. The first count of the petition asked for relief upon two
theories: (a) for defendant's breach of an implied warranty of fitness for
the purpose for which the food was sold, and (b) for negligence in failing
to warn plaintiffs that the food was not fit for the purposes for which
the food was sold, in that it was not a complete fish food and was
inadequate without supplementation to sustain the normal health and
growth of fish, thus causing the fish to become sick and die. On appeal,
it was held that a recovery could be predicated upon either theory and
that a claim for relief was stated in the petition. Limitations of space
prevent at this point a full analysis of the problems raised by the decision,
but the case is quite significant in that the privity of contract requirement, where the food is not in its raw state but where it has been
processed and packaged by the manufacturer, was not required for
liability based upon the theory of implied warranty. In ruling on
defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's petition for failure to state
claims upon which relief could be granted, the decision is based on the
assumption that the fish food was not purchased directly from the
defendant; otherwise there would have been privity of contract and it
would not have been necessary to discuss that problem. The defendant
had conceded the existence of the above theories of liability and their
applicability to the sale of food for human consumption. However,
liability based on a theory of implied warranty, where there was no
privity of contract, has not as yet been passed upon by the Missouri
1. 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
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supreme court in the cases concerning food and beverage for human
consumption. This decision would seem to indicate that the Missouri
supreme court will approve this theory of liability, as developed in the
Missouri courts of appeals in recent years, where the injuries are sus-

tained by human consumption of deleterious food and beverage.
An individual's right of privacy, the right to have one's private affairs
kept free from public gaze, is another interest which is receiving extended
protection as our civilization becomes more complex. While the Missouri
decisions which have recognized this legally protected interest are few
in number, yet they have been recognized as able contributions to the
development in this area of tort law. These cases involved the publication of pictures and printed matters. The case of Biederman's of Springfield v. Wright2 recognizes the invasion of privacy with respect to unreasonable and oppressive methods employed to enforce the collection of
debts. In that case an action was brought for the balance of an account
for merchandise purchased by the defendants. The defendants counterclaimed for damages allegedly caused by the tortious conduct of the
plaintiff in attempting to collect the account. It was alleged that the agent
of the plaintiff appeared in the cafe in which the defendant-wife worked
as a waitress and, among other things, that he followed her around the
restaurant and stated in a loud voice that she and her husband had
refused to pay their bill, that they were deadbeats, that they did not
intend to pay for certain furniture when they got it, and that he intended
to get both of them fired from their jobs. Plaintiffs further alleged that
declaiming such things in a loud and threatening manner tended to
degrade and humiliate them in public. The court held that the counterclaim stated a cause of action for invasion of defendants' right of privacy.
The decision is a contribution to that area of liability for the invasion of
the right of privacy with respect to unreasonable and oppressive methods
employed for the collection of debts. The opinion recognized that "most
of the cases applying the doctrine to methods of debt collection have been
concerned with the use of obnoxious letters, placards, advertisements,
and other printed material calculated to coerce payment without resort
to legal remedies." The court was of the opinion that "the oral publication
of a private matter with which the public has no proper concern may be
just as devastating and damaging as a written communication." 8
2. 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959).

3. Id. at 896-97.
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It is the law of this state that an unemancipated minor cannot sue
his parents for injuries received by reason of an unintentional tort. With
employment so widespread among the teenage group living at home, the
fact of emancipation may be present, and the above rule would not bar
an action by the minor against the parents who have been negligent in
causing injuries to-the minor. Wurth v. Wurth4 points out factors which
prove emancipation for such a suit. The facts in that case were that the
defendant was taking his plaintiff-daughter to work as was his habit. The
icy condition of the street caused the plaintiff to admonish her father
not to drive so fast. Shortly thereafter, the car went into a spin and struck
a lamp post causing the injuries complained of. The plaintiff's evidence
showed that she began to work at her job when 19 years of age. This was
about a year and a half before she was injured. She retained her wages,
paid for her clothing, medical and doctor's bills, paid her parents for
board and room, and, in general, paid all of her own bills. She paid the
hospital bills incurred in this injury. No evidence was submitted that her
parents paid for any of her needs after she had begun work at 19, or that
they had assumed any obligation on her behalf. The verdict for the plaintiff in the trial court was set aside on defendant's motion and judgment
was entered for the defendant. On appeal to the St. Louis Court of
Appeals, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. The case was
ordered transferred by the supreme court which, in an en banc decision,
held the burden of proof, resting upon a party asserting emancipation of a
minor, had been sustained. The verdict for the minor was ordered reinstated and judgment thereon to be entered. Two judges dissented.
An interpretation of the Wrongful Death Act5 pricks the conscience
which permits a negligent driver of an automobile, who caused the
death of two members of a family, to escape liability because his identity
was not discovered for seventeen months as a result of concealment on
his part. In Frazee v. Partney,6 it was held that a cause of action for
wrongful death accrues at the time of the death and not at the time of
the discovery of the identity of the alleged tort-feasor, so that the oneyear limitation of the Wrongful Death Act was not tolled, or the period
extended, by the alleged tort-feasor's fraudulent concealment of his
identity and his criminal violation of the statute requiring a report of

4. 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
5. § 516.280, RSMo 1949.
6. 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958).
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accidents. The decision is an interpretation of the intention of the legisla-

ture in providing an action for wrongful death where no exception
extends the time for bringing the action by reason of the conduct shown
by the defendant in this case. The one year limitation was held to be a
condition imposed on the right itself and part of the cause of action. The
court recognized that "a hardship has resulted here, and this decision has

not been easy. We are forced to construe the cold, clear words of the
statute, and if its. scope is to be enlarged we feel that the remedy is legislative, not judicial. ' 7 Where a defendant admits that at the time of the

accident he was drowsy and had dozed off, that on being aroused by his
wife he realized he had forced plaintiff's car to swerve off the road to
avoid a collision (defendant being on the wrong side of the road and
directly in the path of the plaintiff's car), that he stopped after reaching
the top of the hill to look back but could see nothing, that he stopped
again about a mile farther on and discussed the fact that there might
have been an accident, but then proceeded on to St. Louis, that he made
no report of the accident as required by statute, justice requires that
something be done about this situation. Furthermore, the basic purpose
of the act has been defeated by concealment. There was the germ of an
idea in the concluding part of the opinion: "We deem it unnecessary to
discuss what would have been the effect of a 'John Doe' suit against a
fictitious defendant, as argued pro and con, for no such suit was in fact
filed."s

I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Duties of Persons in CertainRelations
1. Possessors of Land
There were the usual number of cases in which the negligence of
occupiers of stores was in issue as to injuries received by invitees. These
cases turn to whether or not the condition, contended to constitute an
unreasonable risk, was obvious to the customer in the exercise of
ordinary care, or was actually known to the invitee, in which situation
there is no duty on the occupier to warn the invitee. In this situation the
invitee already has the information relative to the condition which a

7. Id. at 921.
8. Ibid. A more extended discussion of the case may be found in Rahoy, TortsWrongful Death Statute in Missouri-Application of General Statutes of Limitation,
24 Mo. L. Rsv. 397 (1959).
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warning would give. In Wilkins v. Allied Stores,9 the injuries received
by a prospective purchaser were sustained when she slipped on the
terrazzo floor of the entranceway into the defendant's store early in the
afternoon on a rainy, cloudy day. The court held that the danger of walking on the terrazzo entranceway, which was spotted or mottled and more
slippery when wet during a rain than the sidewalk of poured concrete,
was open and obvious to the invitee, and there was insufficient evidence
to establish that the lighting conditions or color of the terrazzo, as
compared to the concrete sidewalk, concealed the floor by making it
indistinguishable in color and appearance to the non-slippery adjacent
sidewalk.
The same analysis was made in Howard v. Johnoff Restaurant Co.,' 0
where dining tables in defendant's restaurant were located beside the
dance floor which had an obviously smooth, slick, and shiny surface.
There was no duty to warn a patron that the floor was slippery. The
condition being obvious, or as well known to the plaintiff as to the
defendant, the invitee had the information which a warning would
convey. There was no evidence that the floor of the dance area was
improperly waxed, or that the wax had excessively or unevenly accumulated on the surface as to render the floor not reasonably safe for one
walking across it. That portion of the floor was known by the plaintiff to
have been set apart for dancing and would be expected to be of more
than ordinary smoothness. Furthermore, there was no necessity on the
part of the plaintiff in leaving the dining tables to walk across the dance
floor.
The obvious danger, in Gregorc v. Londoff Cocktail Lounge," was
the sight by the plaintiff patron of another patron of a cocktail lounge
holding a gun on a third patron for fifteen to twenty minutes, and the
exchange of revolver fire between a police officer and the patron with
the gun, whom the officer was trying to disarm and arrest. The means for
escaping the perilous situation were readily available. Since the plaintiff, who was injured in the exchange of revolver fire, was aware that
the conduct of the patron with the gun was dangerous to the safety of the

9.
10.
11.
jury by
(1959).

308 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1958).
312 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1958).
314 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. 1958). Frank, Torts-Missouri-Duty to Invitees-InThird Person When Invitee Has Knowledge of Danger, 24 Mo. L. Rsv. 393
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other patrons, he was not entitled to be warned of that which he already
knew. An instruction on failure to warn the injured patron of the danger
constituted error.
12

The condition of danger in Freeman v. Myron Green Cafeterias Co.
was the leg of a clothes tree in defendant's cafeteria, on which the plaintiff customer caught her toe. Having used the clothes tree, she knew it
was there and occupied a certain position on the floor. But it was for the
jury to determine whether, in the exercise of ordinary care, plaintiff
was required to have observed that the clothes tree was so constructed
that it had legs which extended out from the center post for nine and onehalf inches, each of which rested on a wood block so that each leg was
elevated one and one-half inches above the floor and that, unless she was
careful not to get too close, the toe of her shoe was likely to catch under
one of the elevated legs, or whether there was a duty by the occupier
to warn of this danger. However, the instruction to the effect that if the
plaintiff had looked at the floor and the tree she could have seen the legs
resting on the floor constituted reversible error, for the fact that the
plaintiff could have seen by looking or that it was physically possible to
have seen by looking was not essentially important. The essential fact to
be found was whether the plaintiff in the exercise of ordinary care saw
or should have seen that the legs of the tree were so constructed as to
constitute an unsafe condition.
The same question was before the court in Harbournv. Katz Drug
Co.,' 3 where the plaintiff sustained injuries when she fell over the platform of a plainly visible scale standing in front of a column between two
sets of double doors at the entrance to the store. The platform of the
scale, extending away from the column, was approximately two feet in
length and six inches high and had a black rubber surface. In front of
the scale was an open area or entrance way fourteen to fifteen feet across.
In departing from the store, the invitee went first to the locked set of
doors, then turned to go to the unlocked doors and, as she turned, the
scale was directly at her feet. It was held to be a jury question whether
this condition involving an unusual risk of injury was obvious to the
invitee, or actually known to her. The risk here "was not merely the
presence of the scale between the two sets of double doors but it consisted

12. 317 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1958) (en banc).
13. 318 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. 1958).
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of the combination of circumstances of one set of the doors being locked
and the scale being so located that when an invitee went to the locked
set of doors and then turned to go to the unlocked doors the scale was
directly at his feet outside his normal range of vision and directly in his
path.' 4 By plaintiff's own evidence it was established that the presence
of the scale was open and obvious and that she knew of its presence, but
there was no evidence that she knew or should have known that the set
of doors which she first tried was locked. The case was reversed, however, for error in an instruction which imposed a greater duty on the
defendant than the law requires, in directing a verdict for the plaintiff
if the jury found that defendants failed to warn of the location of the
platform of the scale and failed to erect barriers, that is if they failed to
do both.15
2. Automobiles
While the negligence cases involving automobile accidents comprised
one-fourth of the opinions of the court in the torts field, the issues on
appeal involved instructions and presented little that was new or different in the law itself. Before an analysis of these instructions would
be possible or profitable, a full statement of the facts in evidence would
have to be set forth, and then it is doubtful if the discussion would have
much carry over to other factual situations. Here is an area in the law
providing the basis for most of the appeals which has defied systematic
treatment so that instructions as a subject can be taught. The few general
requirements are readily understandable, but the drafting of instructions
applicable to a set of facts, no two cases having identical facts, can only
be done by a close study of other decisions with similar fact situations. It
is unfortunate that instructions, which are intended to guard the untrained mind of the jury against error in applying the law to the facts of a
particular issue, become themselves our most prolific source of error.
In Evans v. Colombo, 6 the action was for injuries sustained in an
automobile collision which occurred when the motorist's vehicle, in
14. Id. at 231.
15. Since there was an incorrect statement of the law in the conjunctive submission, the doctrine of nonprejudice in a conjunctive submission where several
grounds of negligence are hypothesized, each ground alone being sufficient to support a verdict but one or more of such grounds being unsupported by the evidence,
though there is sufficient evidence to support the other hypothesized ground of negligence, did not apply.
16. 319 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
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making a left-hand turn on the highway from the intersection, skidded on
wet pavement, crossed the center line of the street, and collided with
plaintiff's automobile which was stopped waiting for the traffic light to
change. While negligence may not be inferred from kidding alone, the
court en banc held that it may be found or inferred from circumstances
in evidence of which skidding is a part. The speed in making the turn
on wet asphalt streets, the lack of the use of the brakes or of the steering
mechanism after the skidding started, and other factors provided evidence
from which a jury might infer that there was negligence in the continued
operation or driving of the car across the center line and into collision
with the plaintiff. The plaintiff had a verdict in the trial court; the court
of appeals reversed and remanded the case, holding that plaintiff had not
made a submissible case and finding error in the verdict-directing instruction of the plaintiff; the supreme court held that a submissible case was
made but reversed and remanded the cause for error in the instructions.
The principal errors were that the instruction ignored the factual element
of skidding, and that it assumed that the defendant operated her automobile across the center line, thus excluding the possibility of an accidental
or non-negligent skidding as the proximate cause.
Driving an automobile by the plaintiff in violation of a statute
forbidding any person to operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated
condition constitutes negligence per se, but violation of the statute does
not constitute proximate cause either to constitute contributory negligence
in plaintiff's cause against a negligent defendant or to enable the defendant to recover on his counterclaim against the plaintiff. In Bowman v. Heffron,' 7 the facts necessary to establish causal connection between the
violation of the statute and the collision and injuries to the defendant, and
between the violation of the statute and the plantiff's own injuries should
have been hypothesized and submitted to the jury. No facts were submitted in the instruction on the issue of proximate cause "as to how or
why such condition of plaintiff produced the collision and injuries to the
defendant, nor as to why or how plaintiff's intoxicated condition in
operating the car contributed to his own injuries."' 8 The submission of
proximate cause in general terms constituted reversible error.
3. Carriers
The number of reversals of the Missouri supreme court on certiorari
17.
18.

318 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. 1958).
Id. at 274.
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to the United States Supreme Court in cases based on the Federal
Employers' Liability Act,19 would seem to indicate that the interpretation
of the act is tending to make the employer an insurer of the safety of the
employees while on duty. In Moore v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 20 the injuries

were sustained by a mail and baggage handler employed by the defendant,
when a train while backing into the station came into contact with a
flat wagon the plaintiff was pulling and caused him to be pushed against
a train standing on another track. A verdict for the employee in the
trial court was reversed on appeal to the Missouri supreme court on the
grounds the evidence established that plaintiff's act of turning his
wagon more sharply than was necessary caused the contact with the train,
and that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant.
The per curiam opinion by the United States Supreme Court reversed the
fully considered opinion by the Missouri supreme court as follows:
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of
the Supreme Court of Missouri is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion. We hold
that the proofs justified with reason the jury's conclusion that
employer negligence played a part in producing the petitioner's
injury... [citing cases].21
Mr. Justice Whittaker, with who Mr. Justice Burton joined, dissented
on the ground that the Missouri supreme court was right in holding that
there was nothing to submit to the jury to show negligence on the part
of the employer:
To hold that these facts are sufficient to make a jury case of
negligence under the Act is in practical effect to say that22a railroad is an insurer of its employees. Such is not the law.
On remand, the Missouri supreme court 23 considered instructions refused
and given but found no prejudicial error.
Much the same problem was presented in Rogers v. Thompson 24
where the United States Supreme Court had reversed the Missouri
supreme court which had held that the plaintiff had failed to make a sub-

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

53 Stat. 1404 (1939),
312 S.W.2d 769 (Mo.
358 U.S. 31 (1958).
Id.at 35.
321 S.W.2d 458 (Mo.
308 S.W.2d 688 (Mo.

45 U.S.C. § 51 (1954).
1958).
1959).
1958))
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missible case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for personal
injuries. In remanding the case "for proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion, '2 5 what questions were left exclusively for consideration
and disposition by the Supreme Court of Missouri? The latter court in
ruling that the plaintiff had not made a submissible case, had not passed
upon the instructions nor on the matter of the excessiveness of the
damages. Since the reversal by the United States Supreme Court held
that a submissible case had been made under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, on remand the Missouri supreme court interpreted that
action as disposing of the contention now made that the plaintiff's instruction was erroneous because it failed to hypothesize certain facts essential
to plaintiff's recovery, even though it had not been considered or passed
on by the Missouri supreme court when the case was first before it. But
the question of the excessiveness of the verdict being a nonfederal question, could now be passed upon on the remand.
In an action by a bus passenger against the defendant bus company
for injuries allegedly sustained while alighting from the bus, an instruction "that when the operator of a common carrier stops a bus and opens
the door thereof that said common carrier is assuring passengers thereon
that they can alight from said bus in safety" was held, in Lockhart v. St.
Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 26 to make "the carrier an insurer of the safety of
the passengers in alighting from the bus when the carrier is only required
to use the highest degree of care in selecting a reasonably safe place for
that purpose." 2 7 The judgment was reversed on other grounds, how28
ever.

25. Id. at 689.
26. 318 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. 1958).
27. Id. at 180.

28. In Henderson v. Taylor, 315 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. 1958), it is recognized that a
public ferryman is a common carrier and is legally responsible to exercise the highest
degree of care in equipping the ferry with proper safeguards to protect automobiles
from going off the ferry into the water, but he is not required to equip his boat so
as to prevent abnormal casualties of a character not reasonably to be anticipated.
Here the foot brakes failed completely on plaintiff's automobile before or after
plaintiff started his automobile down a rather steep approach to the river ferry
landing. The impact broke the log chain across the river end of the ferry and the
automobile plunged into the river. The log chain was adequate to prevent automobiles from going off the ferry because of normal or usual movements of automobiles on the ferry. There is no duty on a ferryman to inspect each automobile

before it is driven on the ferry to ascertain whether its brakes are in good working
order and the defendant had no knowledge of the condition of the brakes on plaintiff's
automobile. No submissible case was made.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1959
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The en banc decision in Haberly v. Rearden Co., 29 although applying
New York law because the accident occurred in that state, is considered
in some quarters as one of the big, important cases in the still-expanding
area of products liability. The action was by a twelve year old boy for
damages resulting from the permanent blinding of the boy when cement
base paint, known as Bondex, accidentally lodged on the eye ball. The
boy was assisting his father scrape away debris from bricks which the
father wanted to paint. While the boy was shifting position, his right
eye came in contact with a paint brush dripping with Bondex which his
father was holding at his side. Immediate pain was experienced and the
parents quickly ran water into the eye. Within five to seven minutes,
the boy was on the operating table of a hospital, but the eye was so
burned that sight, other than ability to distinguish beween light and
dark, was permanently gone. In a four to three decision, the court held
that a jury question was presented as to whether the manufacturer
could have reasonably anticipated the likelihood of paint getting into the
eyes of the user or of those who would be helping users, and that it was
not the exact manner of the occurrence which must have been reasonably
forseeable but merely the hazard or risk that such paint by some accidental means would lodge in the eye of one helping the user or otherwise
in the vicinity of its user. Under the law of New York, the manufacturer
was held to owe a duty to-the son adequately to warn his father, as the
user of the paint, of the danger to the son if the paint lodged in the son's
eyeball as a result of the use of the paint in the usual and expected
manner, unless the danger was known or should have been known to
the father or unless the danger was patent.
The decision is worth careful study on the problem of forseeable
risks by the supplier of products and on the adequacy of a warning of
dangers printed on the container of the product. Judge Hyde dissented
on the ground:
that, while a manufacturer may be liable for injuries caused by
the use of his product in the manner and for the purpose for
which it is supplied, he is not liable for negligence of those who
use it. In short, he warrants the safety of his product for its

29. 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958)

(en banc).
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intended use but does not warrant that all users will act without
negligence in using it.s0
He was of the opinion that the negligence of the plaintiff and his father
was the sole cause of the injury.

Although there may be a duty as to forseeable risks owed to the
person supplied by the supplier of a chattel this duty may be performed
by an adequate warning. In Rice v. Allen, 1 a truck owner had asked a
mechanic to get the truck and check the brakes. The owner informed
the mechanic that the foot brakes were out of repair, and there was no
showing that the owner knew that the hand brake was not in good working order. The mechanic chose to drive the truck to the garage, rather
than to have it towed in. While driving the truck both the foot brakes
and the hand brakes failed and he was injured. The court held that
violation of the statute requiring that all motor vehicles be provided at
all times with two sets of adequate brakes, kept in good working order,
was negligence per se, but there are factors of excuse or justifiable'violations:
as long as there is warning of known dangers to those entitled to
notice, it is certainly an 'excusable' or 'justifiable' violation of a
mandatory brake statute for the owner to seek the repair of his
brakes at the hands of an experienced mechanic and in this
circumstance the violation of the statute may be wholly irrele82
vant to the plaintiff's particular claim upon this appeal.
The trial court's direction of a verdict in favor of the defendant was
33
affirmed.

30. Id. at 870. Judge Leedy and Judge Storckman also dissented.
31. 309 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. 1958).
32. Id. at 632.
33. In Cohagan v. Laclede Steel Co., 317 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1958), the use which
was being made of the manufactured product was not the purpose for which it was
manufactured. A shipment of steel, which was being unloaded, fell due to the soft
metal binder wire breaking when the steel buyer's employees placed a hard metal
hook under the comparatively soft wire binder and undertook to lift a bundle of

steel by means of a crane. The purpose of the wire binder was to hold together the
more than 300 strips of steel in the bundle. There was no evidence of any agreement,
express or implied, on the part of the manufacturer to wrap the bundle with wire of
such strength that it could be hooked into for lifting the bundle of steel from the
truck with an overhead crane when unloading the shipment. The fact that the wire
wrapping may have been misused with impunity on isolated occasions did not estab-

lish a duty on the part of the manufacturer to make the wire in such manner that it
could be safely misused. A judgment entered upon a directed verdict in favor of the

seller and the transportation company was affirmed.
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Although the mere fact that one has been injured by a fall on a
street is insufficient to support the inference of a city's negligence or of
sufficient substantiality to support a submission of the issue of negligence,
an instruction to the effect that the mere fact that a pedestrian was
injured by a fall upon the city's street was no evidence that the city was
negligent in keeping its streets in a reasonably safe condition, and that
the pedestrain had the burden of proof of showing negligence, was held,
in Ritterhouse v. City of Springfield,3 4 to be prejudicially erroneous in
excluding from the jury's consideration, in determining the issue of the
city's negligence, the fact that the pedestrian was injured by a fall upon
the city's street. The opinion further states: "in fact, we believe it to be
absolutely untrue to say that the mere fact that plaintiff was 'injured
by a fall' upon City's street was no evidence of itself that defendant was
negligent;" and that "the mere fact of itself is some evidence of the city's
negligence" which should not be excluded from the jury's consideration
as a circumstance to be considered on the issue of negligence in conjunction with the other shown facts and circumstances. The opinion observes
35
"It is possible that this court has not always been of this opinion."
6. Humanitarian Negligence
The torts cases predicated on the humanitarian doctrine will be
covered separately in the next issue of the REviEw by Mr. Becker, so
that more adequate consideration may be given to this important Missouri doctrine.
B. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The applicability of the rule of res ipsa loquitur to the bursting
of an underground water main owned, operated, and under the
exclusive control of a city had not been directly decided by an appellate
court in Missouri, until the case of Adam Hat Stores v. Kansas City.36
There the action was against the city for water damage resulting from a
break in the city's underground water main, installed and maintained
under the exclusive control of the city. One of its six-inch cast-iron mains,
laid approximately four feet below the surface of the street at some time

34. 319 S.W2d 518 (Mo. 1959).
35. Id. at 520-21.
36. 316 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. 1958) (en banc).
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prior to 1900, had split open. The cause of the break was unknown.
Expert testimony stated that ninety percent of all municipal water mains
were made of cast iron, having a minimum duration expectancy of 100
years or more, and that cast-iron water mains break because of excessive
internal water pressure, excessive impact from traffic over the surface
of the street, settlement of soils, and electrolysis. The expert witness
was of the opinion that the pipe could have broken because of uneven
settlement of the soils. The court en banc in holding that the doctrine res
ipsa loquitur was applicable in making a submissible case of negligence
said:
Admittedly, a water main, if properly laid and sound when laid,
ordinarily would last without breaking for a minimum of 100
years, in the absence of internal or external violance. It is
reasonable to infer therefore, that when the main broke after
some 53 years of service, approximately one-half of its minimum
expected duration, the pipe either was defective when laid, was
carelessly laid or maintained or was subjected to such internal or
external force as to cause it to break, or that it broke as a result
of a combination of one or more of those causes.37
The opinion may be considered as another contribution to this area
of negligence law. Two judges dissented on the ground that the court
could not "take 'judicial notice, as a matter of common knowledge and
experience, that the accident could not have occurred but for negligence
on the part of the defendant.' "38
The doctrine res ipsa loquitur was also applied to injuries received
by a switchman when he was struck by a swinging rear door of a truck
while he was guarding a crossing; 30 to injuries sustained by one doing
work for defendant when a metal scaffold furnished by defendant, on
which the plaintiff was standing, fell over; 40 to injuries sustained when a
plate glass window of defendant's building abutting the sidewalk broke
as the plaintiff was viewing merchandise through the window in a show
room in that building; 4' and to injuries received by a passenger in an
automobile when it went onto the highway shoulder and overturned,

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 593.
Id. at 601.
Bone v. General Motors Corp., 322 S.W.2d 916 (Mo. 1959).
Parlow v. Carson-Union-May-Stern Co., 310 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1958).
Leisure v. J. A. Bruening Co., 315 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. 1958).
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allegedly as a result of trying to avoid bales of hay which had fallen on
42
the roadway from an approaching truck driven by the defendant.
C. Proximate Cause
Where negligent conduct impairs the physical condition of another's
body, whether the defendant is also liable for an injury sustained in
a subsequent accident which would not have occurred had the other's
43
bodily efficiency not been impaired, was presented in Bowyer v. Te-Co.
There the first injury due to the defendant's negligence was to the
plaintiff's right ankle. After the cast was removed and plaintiff was
advised to bear weight on the leg and ankle, he discarded his crutches
and attempted to resume his duties without the use of a cane, but his
right ankle was still stiff and had been weak ever since the original
break. The following month, he attempted to step from the ground to a
porch extending in front of his granary. The porch was seven inches
above the ground. As he placed his weight upon his right ankle to
lift his left foot to the porch his right ankle would not hold him and
he fell, the fall breaking his left ankle. Where through no fault of his
the plaintiff rebreaks the same leg while recuperating, or where after
the leg mends he suffers another break to the same leg due to its
permanently weakened condition and which would not have broken
otherwise, the courts have little difficulty in finding that the original
negligence was the cause of the subsequent injury. The instant case
goes one step further in that the second accident causes an injury to
some other part of the plaintiff's body. The evidence was held sufficient
"to support a finding that the second fracture was a natural and proximate consequence of the same negligent act which caused plaintiff's first
'44
fall and fracture.
D. Defenses in Negligence Cases
In Welcome v. Braun,45 an instruction in an intersection collision
was held to be prejudicially erroneous which provided that after plaintiff
entered the intersection if she could have seen the approaching automobile of the defendant if she had looked to the north, could have realized
that there was danger of a collision and could have brought her auto-

42. Layton v. Palmer, 309 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1958).
43. 310 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1958).

44. Id. at 900.
45. 319 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. 1958).
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mobile to a stop before going into the path of defendant's car, that
failure to do these things was contributory negligence. The court held
that this pla~ed upon the plaintiff the absolute duty of seeing and knowing
what she could have seen and known and the additional duty of stopping
if she could have done so, whereas plaintiff was only required to exercise
the highest degree of care in looking, seeing, realizing and in endeavoring
to stop.
A motorist familiar with a railroad crossing and knowing of its
exact location drove his automobile at nighttime into the side of defendant's moving freight train. The approach to the crossing was around
an "S" curve which did not straighten out until approximately 100 feet
before coming to the crossing. Driving at a rate of speed which precluded
him from stopping after he could see the frieight train moving across the
highway crossing, was held in Turner v. Illinois Cent. R.R. 40 to constitute
47
contributory negligence as a matter of law.

To drive an automobile at night into the rear of an unlighted trailer
unit which was parked along the curb in a city where vehicles normally
park and may be expected to be, was held in Lemken v. Brooks
Truck Lines, Inc. 48 to constitute contributory negligence as a matter of
law. The motorists view to the place where the trailer unit was parked
was unobstructed for 250 feet, the night was dark and clear, the motorists
headlights and brakes were in good working order, the motorists needed
to turn to his left only two or three feet to have cleared the trailer unit,
and there was no other diverting or distracting event. The case was distinguished from collisions with stationary vehicles which were blocking
travel portions outside the limits of a city, where there would be no
reason to anticipate the presence of stationary trucks.
E. Burden of Proof
The court for some time had been admonishing against the giving of

46.
47.

319 SW2d 539 (Mo. 1959).
Under Kansas law is Caraway v. A.T. & SY. Ry., 318 S.W.2d 331 (Mo. 1958),

where it was held that a motorist, traveling at such speed as to be unable to stop
his vehicle short of the pathway of an approaching train when he came to a place
where his view was unobstruced, would be contributorily negligent as a matter of

law; but in view of other evidence that a warning device had failed, contributory
negligence was for the jury.
48. 322 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. 1959).
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a burden of proof instruction which includes the phrase "to the satisfaction of the jury." In Highfill v. Brown,4 9 the court again says:
Instruction on burden of proof in civil cases requiring the jury
to find that the burden of proof must be sustained by 'the greater
weight of the credible evidence, to the satisfaction of the jury'
have been condemned by this court so often that it is difficult
to understand that any party litigant would risk asking that such
instruction be given. In fact, such instructions should not contain
the phrase, 'to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury.' All that
should be required is that the party on whom the burden is cast
must prove his case by a preponderance, that is, the greater
weight of the credible evidence. [Citing Missouri cases condeming this phrase.]
If the trial court grants a new trial containing these "satisfaction" phrases,
the supreme court will defer to that ruling. 50

49. 320 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo. 1959). There is also a similar warning in Hustad
v. Cooney, 308 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. 1958).
50. Ilgenfritz v. Quinn, 318 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. 1958). In Jewell v. Arnett, 318
S.W.2d 277 (Mo. 1958), an instruction to the effect that the burden of proof rested
upon the plaintiff to prove by the preponderence or greater weight of "all the evidence" in the case was held not to constitute prejudicial error because of the omission of the word "credible".
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